Friday, May 14, 2010

Security for automotive control networks

News is breaking today that automotive control networks are vulnerable to attacks if you inject malicious messages onto them (see this NY Times article as an example). It's good that someone has taken the trouble to demonstrate the attack, but to our research group the fact that such vulnerabilities exist isn't really news. We've been working on countermeasures for several years, sponsored by General Motors.

If this sort of issue affects you, here is a high level overview. Pretty much any embedded network doesn't have  support for authentication of messages. By that, I mean there is no way to tell if the node sending a particular message is really the node that is supposed to be sending it. It is pretty easy to reverse engineer the messages on a car network and find out, for example, that message header ID #427 is the one that disables the car engine (not the real ID number and not necessarily a real message -- just an example). Once you know that, all you have to do is connect to the network and send that message. Easy to do. Probably a lot of our undergraduates could do it. (Not that we teach them to be malicious -- but they shouldn't get an "A" in the courses I teach if they can't handle something as simple as that!)

The problem is that, historically, embedded networks have been closed systems. Designers assumed there was no way to connect to them from the outside, and by extension assumed they wouldn't be attacked. That is all changing with connectivity to infotainment systems and the Internet.


As I said, we've worked out a solution to this problem. My PhD student Chris Szilagyi published the long version in this paper from 2009. The short version is that what you want to do is add a few bits of cryptographically secure authentication to each network message. You don't have a lot of bits to work with (CAN has a maximum 8 byte payload). So you put in just a handful of authentication bits in each message. Then you accumulate multiple messages over time until the receiver is convinced that the message is authentic enough for its purposes. For something low risk, a couple messages might be fine. For something high risk, you collect more messages to be sure it is unlikely an attacker has faked the message. It's certainly not "free", but the approach seems to provide reasonable tradeoff points among cost, speed, and security.

There is no such thing as perfectly secure, and it is reasonable for manufacturers to avoid the expense of security measures if attacks aren't realistically going to happen. But if they are going to happen, it is our job as researchers to have countermeasures ready for when they are needed. (And, if you are a product developer, your job to make sure you know about solutions when it is time to deploy them.)


I'm going to get into my car and drive home today without worrying about attacks on my vehicle network at all. But, eventually it might be a real concern.

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